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Abstract 
 
In this paper I theorize the roles of effective demand and Say’s Law in the Marxist theory of 
exploitation and accumulation. I claim that an exogenous rate of exploitation implies 
deploying the strongest version of Say’s Law, which leads profit rates not to equalize across 
sectors. Marx’s own procedure in Capital III was therefore logically mistaken. Once Keynes’ 
principle of effective demand is introduced, the rate of exploitation, and hence the distribution 
of income between wages and profits, becomes endogenous to aggregate demand. Profit 
rates can then equalize across sectors and prices of production can function as gravitational 
centers for market prices in a competitive economy. I develop an innovative evolutionary 
approach to demonstrate how effective demand, within the Marxist framework, determines 
the rate of exploitation and the rate of profit. At the intersection of Marx, Keynes, and Kalecki, 
my evolutionary framework integrates effective demand, functional income distribution, profit 
rate equalization, technological diffusion, and the gravitation towards prices of production. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to theorize the roles of effective demand and Say’s Law in the Marxist 
theory of exploitation and accumulation. I argue that an exogenous rate of exploitation implies deploying 
the strongest version Say’s Law; which leads profit rates not to equalize across sectors. Once Keynes’ 
principle of effective demand is introduced, the rate of exploitation, and hence the distribution of income 
between wages and profits, becomes endogenous to aggregate demand. Profit rates can then equalize across 
sectors and prices of production can function as gravitational centers for market prices in a competitive 
economy.  
At the intersection of Marx, Keynes, and Kalecki, this paper develops an innovative evolutionary 
approach to demonstrate how aggregate demand, within the Marxist framework, determines the rate of 
exploitation, the rate of profit, the functional distribution of income, the diffusion of new techniques of 
production, the equalization of profitability, and the gravitation towards of prices of production. My 
approach allows for a clear contrast between Say’s Law and Keynes’ principle of effective demand in a 
Marxist framework. It additionally provides an evolutionary mechanism through which profit rates equalize 
under effective demand, which is a mechanism that Kalecki overlooked in his work. Lastly, my approach 
demonstrates that the Okishio theorem fails to hold once the real wage is endogenous. 
In the Marxist tradition Say’s Law has often appeared in its strongest version, which I shall call 
Say’s super-Identity —that all values must be fully realized for all commodities produced. Say’s super-
Identity is usually introduced via the assumption that the rate of exploitation at the firm level is given 
exogenously. Under an exogenous rate of exploitation, the ex ante rate of exploitation in the production 
sphere is identical to the ex post rate of exploitation realized in the market.  
Marx himself was ambiguous in his original writings regarding the role of effective demand 
(Robison 1947; Shoul 1957). In the three volumes of Capital, in the Grundrisse, and in Theories of Surplus 
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Value, he repeatedly claimed that there is no guarantee that markets will realize the values created in the 
sphere of production. Marx even located the potential lack of demand for the output in the function of 
money as a means of hoarding, of money as an end in itself. The Marxist literature then developed its own 
branch of inquiry into realization problems and realization crises. Yet, Marx also often assumed the 
strongest version of Say’s Law in his reproduction schemes, such that all values produced were always 
fully realized. In the third volume of Capital, Marx introduced competition among different companies and 
offered novel ideas on profit rate equalization and falling profitability amid technological progress. But in 
this reproduction model the strongest version of Say’s Law is again deployed and the demand side plays a 
secondary role in the theory of accumulation and exploitation. 
Because of his death in 1883, Marx left unfinished the drafts of the second and third volumes of 
Capital. Engels later edited and published the manuscripts in the 1890s, but the connections between 
effective demand, exploitation, and accumulation were left incomplete. Since the advent of Keynesian and 
Kaleckian macroeconomics in the 1930s, Marxists have attempted to offer new insights into how the theory 
of effective demand relates to Marx’s theory of capital accumulation. The influential works of Baran and 
Sweezy, for example, represented serious attempts to integrate aggregate demand into the Marxist 
framework. Dutt (2011), however, recently argued that the demand side in Marxist theory remains 
underdeveloped. 
Marx’s procedure in the third volume of Capital was logically inconsistent as he assumed 
simultaneously an exogenous rate of exploitation and profit rate equalization. His assumption of an 
exogenous rate of exploitation at the firm level implicitly depends on the strongest version of Say's Law; 
as the rate of exploitation can be exogenous only if all values produced, hence all surplus value and profits, 
are always fully realized. Because in Marx’s reproduction schemes the total wage bill is advanced at the 
beginning of the capital circuit, an exogenous rate of exploitation predetermines the amount of profits to be 
realized even at the firm level. Profitability is predetermined in such a way that firms’ profit rates become 
unresponsive to the amount of capital advanced in each sector. An exogenous rate of exploitation further 
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implies that the functional distribution of income between wages and profits is also exogenous and 
unresponsive to the accumulation of capital. In this case, there is no self-correction mechanism that would 
equalize profit rates across sectors. Prices of production, or the prices that correspond to equalized profit 
rates, cannot function as gravity centers for market prices.  
However, if the principle of effective demand is introduced then Say's super-Identity no longer 
holds. In this case, as I will demonstrate, the rate of exploitation can become endogenous and dependent on 
aggregate demand, and profit rates can equalize across sectors. When aggregate demand is taken into 
account the ex post rate of exploitation automatically becomes dependent upon it and profit rates can 
equalize across sectors. This equalization occurs because sector profitability can then respond negatively 
to the capital committed to production in each sector. Over-supply in one sector will erode profits in that 
sector and capital will then gradually move to other sectors. Once the ex post rate of exploitation is 
endogenous to effective demand, the distribution of income between wages and profits also becomes 
endogenous to aggregate demand. 
Marxist scholars must drop Say’s Law once and for all. Incorporating the principle of effective 
demand into Marxist theory leads us to a better understanding of how aggregate demand determines the 
rate of exploitation, the rate of profit, and the gravitation towards prices of production. 
2. Say’s Law and Effective Demand 
Becker and Baumol (1952) and Baumol (1977; 1999) were the first to notice the ambiguity of the 
term ‘Say’s Law’. This ambiguity is present in J. B. Say’s own work and further reproduced by James Mill, 
David Ricardo, Marx, Keynes, Oskar Lange, and also by Kalecki. Becker and Baumol pointed out that 
Say’s Law actually has two versions, one stronger (Say’s Identity) and one weaker (Say’s Equality). They 
proposed the following definitions: 
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(i) Walras’ Law: Total demand (including the demand for money) equals total supply 
(including the supply of money). This is just a definition; no direction of causality is 
implied between supply and demand. 
(ii) Say’s Identity (stronger version): Total supply automatically becomes, and is identical to, 
total demand. This happens because no one ever wants to hold cash, so all sales incomes 
are immediately spent on other goods and services. The demand for money does not affect 
aggregate demand, supply, or income. Money is just a veil. Recessions and cycles can 
happen but are entirely supply-driven. 
(iii) Say’s Equality (weaker version): Demand is supply-led and the equilibrium between 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply is stable, such that deviations from it are possible 
but self-correcting. Because of supply-side issues such as coordination problems and 
miscalculations, recessions and cycles are possible though brief. Money can be used as a 
store of value, and as a medium of exchange the supply of money is determined 
endogenously. 
Growth, cycles, and recessions were supply-driven phenomena in Say’s and Ricardo’s reasoning, 
which represented the core of Classical Political Economy. Ricardo, in fact, claimed in many of his writings 
that cycles are not caused by aggregate demand deficiency but in fact by miscalculations about what to 
produce and in what proportions. The crucial issue is therefore not a lack of aggregate demand but a 
temporary mismatch between the composition of aggregate demand and aggregate supply, solved through 
the movement of capitals across sectors. Say and Ricardo attributed economic crisis not to oversupply but 
to underproduction (Béraud and Numa 2018; Kates 1997; Becker and Baumol 1952; Baumol 1977, 1999; 
Vianello 1989). 
Applications of Say’s Law are ambiguous because economists do not properly differentiate 
between Say’s Identity and Say’s Equality. In the Marxist tradition the situation is complicated by the fact 
that Marx himself had a dual position regarding Say’s Law: 
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Marx evidently failed to realize how much the orthodox theory stands or falls with Say's Law and 
set himself the task of discovering a theory of crises which would apply to a world in which Say's 
Law was fulfilled, as well as the theory which arises when Say's Law is exploded. This dualism 
implants confusion in Marx's own argument, and, still more, in the arguments of his successors 
(Robinson 1947, p.51). 
Marx certainly did not endorse Say’s Law in any way in any of its versions but this duality is indeed 
part of his work (Shoul 1957). Despite criticizing Say’s Law since the beginning of volume I of Capital, 
Marx often assumed its strongest version (what I call Say’s super-Identity) in his reproduction schemes in 
volumes II and III, implying that values were always fully realized for all commodities produced. 
Say’s Law and Keynes’ principle of effective demand determine in very different ways the 
direction of causality between the core elements of Marxist theory (Trigg 2006). An example of this is the 
direction of causality between aggregate demand and the profit rate. A substantial branch of the Marxist 
tradition would assign the profit rate as the cause and demand as the effect, which amounts to deploying 
Say’s Law and making the economy supply-led. Discussions of the tendency of the profit rate to fall feature 
this type of reasoning. For underconsumptionists, on the contrary, the profit rate is the effect and aggregate 
demand is the cause, in which case the profit rate becomes itself endogenous to demand. 
The principle of effective demand remains a hotly debated concept even within the post-Keynesian 
tradition. In this paper I follow Chick (1983), Hayes (2007), Hartwig (2007), Allain (2009), and Casarosa 
(1981) in their understanding of effective demand as the firms’ effective commitment to production. Given 
the technology and cost structure, effective demand refers to how expected profitability determines supply 
and employment decisions at the beginning of the production period. Hence, this ex ante commitment is 
not identical to the ex post aggregate expenditures with consumption and investment. Effective demand is 
the firms’ profit-maximizing expected proceeds, an ex ante concept relating to expectations but revised in 
line with ex post realized incomes. Even though aggregate demand and aggregate expenditure are not 
identical, they can be equal when ex ante expectations are fulfilled ex post, but not otherwise. Therefore, 
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“effective demand is an unfortunate term, for it really refers to the output that will be supplied; in general 
there is no assurance that it will also be demanded” (Chick 1983, p.65).  
In Kalecki’s work effective demand is featured, but is not identical to that of Keynes. Assuming 
workers do not save, the capitalists’ aggregate expenditures with investment and consumption goods 
determine the level of aggregate profits. Workers spend what they get, while capitalists get what they spend. 
Real aggregate gross profit is determined entirely at the macro level, while income and output are set in the 
interaction between the micro and macro levels (Kriesler 1989). Kalecki derives his theory of effective 
demand from the national account identities and from the fact that capitalists decide their expenditures but 
not their incomes. As in Keynes, investment is autonomous from savings, and changes in income ensure 
that savings accommodate to the level of investment. 
In Marxist theory the principle of effective demand means that the expected profit rate determines 
the firms’ constant and variable capitals advanced at the beginning of the production period, as well as the 
firms’ supply of commodities in the current production period. Market prices can change during the 
production period, but output changes only in the transition from one production period to the next. The 
beginning-of-period expenditures, which comprise the firms’ effective commitment to production, will then 
realize the values created at the end of the previous production period. Since the economy is structured as 
a chain of capital circuits, the ex ante aggregate demand at time t+1 determines the ex post realization of 
values from period t. 
In the next section I discuss how effective demand determines the ex post rate of exploitation, and 
how it connects to the equalization of profit rates in the formation of prices of production. 
3. Exploitation, Profit Rate Equalization, and Production Prices 
In Chapter 9 of Capital III, Marx theorized the equalization of profit rates and the formation of 
prices of production. As I will demonstrate, Marx’s procedure was logically inconsistent, for he employed 
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an exogenous rate of exploitation and, hence, deployed Say’s super-Identity. In Chapter 15 of Capital III, 
Marx then explicitly considered the difference between the ex ante and ex post rates of exploitation, 
mentioning the role of aggregate expenditures (consumption plus investment) in the realization of 
exploitation. Marx’s insights in Chapter 15 actually offer a solution to his own mistake in Chapter 9: 
The conditions for immediate exploitation and for the realization of that exploitation are not 
identical. Not only are they separate in time and space, they are also separate in theory. The former 
is restricted only by the society's productive forces, the latter by the proportionality between the 
different branches of production and by the society's power of consumption. And this is determined 
… by the power of consumption within a given framework of antagonistic conditions of distribution 
[…]. It is further restricted by the drive for accumulation, the drive to expand capital and produce 
surplus-value on a larger scale (Marx [1894]1994, p.352-353 – emphasis added). 
In the 1930s, Kalecki built on Marx’s insights to claim that real aggregate gross profit is determined 
at the macro level by the capitalists’ aggregate expenditures. Assuming workers do not save, capitalists 
cannot realize more surplus value in the aggregate than their own expenditures (Sardoni 2009; 1989). No 
matter how large the ex ante rate of exploitation in the production sphere, the capitalist class can only realize 
an ex post rate of exploitation that makes total profits match its own expenditures. Kalecki, however, did 
not explain how profit rates would equalize across sectors and hence ignored prices of production in his 
analysis (Jossa 1989; Vianello 1989). 
The gravitation of market prices toward prices of production has been the object of rigorous study 
in the Marxist literature. These studies offer a level of technical detail that is much more precise than the 
numerical and verbal examples that Marx offered in volumes II and III of Capital. In this literature there is 
an agreement on two main results: (i) profit rates do not always equalize and thus prices of production 
cannot always function as stable attractors for market prices (Harris 1972; Nikaido 1983, 1985; Flaschel 
and Semmler 1985; Boggio 1985, 1990; Kubin 1990; Duménil and Lévy 1999, 1995; Prado 2006); (ii) 
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market prices that ensure balanced reproduction across sectors are not necessarily the set of prices that can 
also ensure profit rate equalization (Cockshott 2017).  
On the empirical side of the literature (Scharfenaker and Semieniuk 2017, Fröhlich 2013, and 
Farjoun and Machover 1983) there has been a growing consensus that profitability converges not to a single 
uniform profit rate but actually to a non-uniform statistical equilibrium distribution of profit rates. Shaikh 
(2016) shows that profit rates on new investment projects (what Keynes labeled the ‘marginal efficiency of 
capital’) tend to equalize over time. 
In this paper I build on this existing scholarship and introduce an evolutionary framework that 
closely mimics Marx’s original insights on exploitation, accumulation, and technological progress in 
volume III of Capital. I develop this framework to contrast the implications of the principle of effective 
demand with those of Say’s Law. My approach consists of using replicator dynamics from evolutionary 
game theory to describe the competitive selection that occurs simultaneously at the micro intra-sector and 
at the macro inter-sector levels. The replicator dynamics describe an updating process with random 
interactions in which behaviors with higher payoffs proliferate. It is a useful device to mimic the 
competitive struggle for survival in natural and social environments, for it models the process of 
equilibration by tracking the results of individual interactions (Bowles 2006; Gintis 2009; Prado 2006, 
2002). The proposed framework formalizes key aspects of Marx’s theory of accumulation and profitability 
in an adaptive system, in which agents control their actions but not the aggregate consequences of their 
individual decisions. Micro decisions produce macro outcomes that then feed back again into micro 
decisions. 
First, I formalize the macro inter-sector competition through which the aggregate and growing 
monetary capital of an economy is continuously redistributed between two sectors: sector I produces the 
means of production and sector II produces the final consumption good. The continuous redirection of 
monetary capital between sectors takes place according to profit rate differentials. Second, I formalize the 
micro intra-sector competition in which individual firms within each sector compete against each other via 
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cost-reducing technical change. Innovations are gradually adopted based on profit rate differentials within 
sectors. Once the real wage is endogenous, the Okishio (1961) theorem does not hold and technical change 
can reduce profitability over the longer run. 
I then provide two different closures for the model. In the first closure I use an exogenous rate of 
exploitation that amounts to deploying the strongest version of Say’s Law, under which all values produced 
are always fully realized. This is the same closure that Marx employed in Chapter 9 of Capital III. But 
unlike Marx’s supposition, prices of production do not function as gravitational centers for market prices 
under Say’s super-Identity. In the second closure, on the contrary, I introduce the principle of effective 
demand and make the rate of exploitation, the profit rate, and the growth rate dependent upon the level of 
aggregate demand. Marx suggests this second closure in Chapter 15 of Capital III. In this case profit rates 
can equalize and market prices can converge toward production prices. For both closures I present computer 
simulations and an analysis of the evolutionary stability of the long-run equilibria.  
4. Macro Inter-Sector Competition 
The economy-wide circuit of monetary capital, which starts and ends with capital in the form of 
money, can be represented through the following aggregation: 
 𝑀𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 {
𝐿𝑃
𝑀𝑃
… 𝑃 … 𝐶𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑡
′ (1) 
An initial amount of money 𝑀𝑡 purchases two types of commodities as inputs, 𝐶𝑡: labor power (LP) 
and means of production (MP).  During the subsequent production phase (… 𝑃 …) labor power creates more 
value than its own. The difference between the value that labor power creates and the value of labor power 
itself is the surplus value. The total value of the gross output 𝐶𝑡
′ contains the new value added created by 
productive workers, plus the pre-existing value transferred from the means of production. The gross output 
exchanges for a sum of money represented by the aggregate gross expenditures 𝑀𝑡
′. The extra value that 
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workers create and for which they receive no compensation is the basis for the gross profits ∆𝑀𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡
′ −
𝑀𝑡 in the system. 
The economy comprises two sectors, each producing a single type of output using both labor power 
and means of production. Sector I supplies a homogenous type of means of production. Sector II supplies 
a homogenous type of final consumption good. Economic events take place temporally, therefore, the 
overlap of any two consecutive circuits of the total monetary capital can be represented as follows: 
 
               𝑀𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 {
𝐿𝑃
𝑀𝑃
… 𝑃 … 𝐶𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑡
′ 
  𝑀𝑡+1 − 𝐶𝑡+1 {
𝐿𝑃
𝑀𝑃
… 𝑃 … 𝐶′𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑡+1
′  
(2) 
The circuit at period t+1 formally repeats the circuit at period t. The crucial relation is then that 
between the total value realized 𝑀𝑡
′ at the end of period t and the total monetary capital 𝑀𝑡+1 advanced at 
the beginning of period t+1. Because of its supply-led principle, Say’s Law in any of its versions means 
that causality runs from 𝑀𝑡 to 𝑀𝑡
′ and then to 𝑀𝑡+1. Say’s super-Identity, the strongest version of Say’s 
Law, further implies that all values produced in …P… are always fully realized in 𝑀𝑡
′, and that the value 
realized in 𝑀𝑡
′ is advanced in 𝑀𝑡+1. The principle of effective demand, on the contrary, implies that the 
direction of causality actually runs from the ex ante demand 𝑀𝑡+1 at the beginning of period t+1 to the 
realization of the total value 𝑀𝑡
′ at the end of the previous period t. 
There is no fixed capital in this economy, so non-labor inputs are circulating capital only. The 
means of production that enter as inputs in sectors I and II in period t are the previous output of sector I in 
period t-1. Technology is represented by a linear production structure with fixed coefficients and constant 
returns to scale. Using 𝑎𝑗𝑖 to indicate the quantity of input 𝑗 per unit of output 𝑖, the matrix of input-output 
coefficients is: 
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 𝐴 = [𝑎𝑗𝑖] =  [
𝑎11 𝑎12
0 0
]       with    0 ≤ 𝑎𝑗𝑖 < 1  (3) 
Using 𝑙𝑖 to indicate the quantity of labor hours per unit of output in sector 𝑖, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 to indicate the 
within-sector profit rate per unit of output, 𝑝𝑖  to indicate the market price per unit of output, and 𝑤 to 
indicate the money wage per work hour, then per unit of output we have [𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1𝑎𝑗𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖](1 + 𝑟𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑝𝑖,𝑡. 
For each sector the price system is: 
 
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎11 + 𝑤𝑙1](1 +  𝑟1,𝑡) = 𝑝1,𝑡 
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎12 + 𝑤𝑙2](1 + 𝑟2,𝑡) = 𝑝2,𝑡 
(4) 
The first term inside the brackets on the left-hand side represents constant capital, and the second 
term represents variable capital or the value of labor power, both in money terms. Their summation 
[𝑝𝑗,𝑡−1𝑎𝑗𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖] is the unit cost. Competition within each sector then simultaneously determines profit 
rates and prices.  
Although the nominal wage per work hour 𝑤  is exogenously given by the bargaining power 
between workers and capitalists, the real wage 
𝑤
𝑝2,𝑡
, in terms of quantities of the consumption good produced 
in sector II, is determined endogenously. Workers get their money wages and spend it as they like, not 
bound to any real wage specified in terms of a bundle of goods. Labor supply and credit are assumed not 
to be binding constraints on growth. 
In each sector there is a collection of several firms and each of them can switch between sectors 
depending on the average profitability ?̅?𝑖,𝑡. Capitalists commit their capitals to where they expect to profit 
the most. But once firms flow into a sector aiming at the prevailing ?̅?𝑖,𝑡  they will immediately and 
unintentionally alter this average profitability. Supposing a very large collection of firms in the economy, 
we can normalize the total number of firms to unity and then consider only the evolution of population 
shares, with 𝑓1,𝑡 representing the fraction committed to sector I and 𝑓2,𝑡 the fraction committed to sector II: 
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 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑓1,𝑡𝑀𝑡 +  𝑓2,𝑡𝑀𝑡 = 𝑀1,𝑡 + 𝑀2,𝑡     with      𝑓1,𝑡 +  𝑓2,𝑡 = 1 (5) 
Outputs 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 supplied by each sector are the sectoral monetary capitals advanced divided by the 
respective unit costs. Sectoral supply expands when more monetary capital is advanced in the sector at the 
beginning of the production period, and it contracts when capitalists withdraw their initial expenditures: 
 𝑥𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝑓𝑖,𝑡𝑀𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖]
 =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖]
 (6) 
Within each sector, 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′  indicates the end-of-period gross expenditures or the valorized monetary 
capitals that comprise the original monetary capitals 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 advanced plus the surplus value realized. Market 
prices 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 are the end-of-period expenditures divided by quantities supplied: 
 𝑝𝑖,𝑡  =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑀𝑖,𝑡(1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡)
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑓𝑖,𝑡 𝑀𝑡 (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡)
𝑥𝑖,𝑡
 (7) 
The monetary capital 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 committed to sector 𝑖 at the beginning of time t is valorized on average 
to (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡) after the output is sold. The fraction (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡) includes the replication of the money initially 
spent plus average profits. Hence, the valorized capital in each sector is 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ =  𝑀𝑖,𝑡 (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡)  =
 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  𝑀𝑡 (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡) . Using 𝑟?̃?  to indicate the economy-wide weighted average profit rate, such that 
(1 +  𝑟?̃?) = ∑ 𝑓𝑖,𝑡(1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡)𝑖 , the aggregate valorized capital for the entire economy is: 
 𝑀𝑡
′ =  𝑀𝑡 (1 + 𝑟?̃?) = ∑ 𝑀𝑖,𝑡  (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡) 
𝑖
=  ∑ 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  𝑀𝑡 (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡) 
𝑖
 (8) 
The shares of the total monetary capital advanced at the beginning of period t+1 change according 
to the average profitability obtained in period t in each sector: 
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 𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′
𝑀𝑡
′ =  
𝑓𝑖,𝑡  𝑀𝑡 (1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡) 
𝑀𝑡  (1 +  𝑟?̃?)
=  𝑓𝑖,𝑡  
(1 + ?̅?𝑖,𝑡) 
(1 +  𝑟?̃?)
 (9) 
Rewriting it as  
𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1
𝑓𝑖,𝑡
=
(1+?̅?𝑖,𝑡) 
(1+ 𝑟?̃?)
 , subtracting 1 from both sides and using  Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1  = 𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 −  𝑓𝑖,𝑡 , 
we then obtain the replicator equation that formalizes the macro competition between capitalists across 
sectors: 
 Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜇 𝑓𝑖,𝑡  (
1
1 + 𝑟?̃?
) [?̅?𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑟?̃?] (10) 
The profitability gap in relation to the economy-wide average determines how capitalists allocate 
their monetary capitals across sectors. The coefficient 𝜇 ∈ (0,1]  indicates that only a fraction of the 
capitalists in each sector will in fact shift their capital to a different activity that is currently benefitting 
from higher returns. The complementary fraction (1 − 𝜇) of the firms cannot update their behavior even 
when return differentials are an incentive for them to do so. 
The individual search for profits creates unintended consequences in both the sector-level and the 
economy-wide average profit rates. Capitalists make decisions based on profit rates prevailing in each 
sector, not on the economy-wide profit rate. But they end up affecting aggregate profitability through their 
decentralized individual actions to move their capitals from one sector to another. The effects on the 
aggregate profit rate then feed back into individual decisions about where to commit the monetary capital 
in the following period.  
The equations so far presented describe the growth of output and the evolutionary adjustments that 
regulate the shares of monetary capitals over time at the macro level. In the next section I turn to the 
competition for profits through cost-reducing technical change that characterizes the micro-adjustments 
within each sector. 
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5. Micro Intra-Sector Competition 
Large collections of firms compete for profits within each sector. Markets are intensely 
competitive, forcing firms to sell at prevailing market prices. The way to increase individual profit lies 
therefore with the adoption of new cost-reducing technologies. Innovations are generated exogenously and 
then adopted conditional on enhancing individual profitability. When an individual firm decides upon the 
adoption of a new productive structure it does so taking the prevailing market price as given. But the 
individual adoption of the newer technique changes the sector cost structure, and it therefore unintentionally 
affects the market price. The new market price then operates as a signal for the remaining firms to also 
adopt the cost-reducing technique. Each sector will thus display a production structure that is a combination 
of firms producing with the new technique and firms still producing with the old technique. 
The economy has three evolutionary processes taking place concurrently. The first is the 
evolutionary diffusion of new techniques in the sector producing means of production. The second is the 
evolutionary diffusion of new techniques in the sector producing final consumption goods. The third is the 
evolutionary distribution of the growing aggregate monetary capital between sectors. An individual 
decision to adopt a new technique thus triggers a chain of reactions and feedback effects that no individual 
capitalist can anticipate. Externalities exist in this economy given that firms do not fully internalize the 
social consequences of their individual actions.  
The prevailing technique of production is represented in the set of four technical parameters 
(𝑎11
𝑜 , 𝑎12
𝑜 , 𝑙1
𝑜, 𝑙2
𝑜). An innovation (𝑎11
𝑛 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑛) can imply the use of more of labor power and means of 
production, less of both inputs, or more of one input and less of the other (superscript 𝑜 for ‘old’ and 𝑛 for 
‘new’ technique). Rearranging the price equations in (4) we get the profit rate per unit produced using 
current technology, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 : 
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 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 =
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜]
− 1 (11) 
Similarly, the profit rate associated with the new technology is:  
 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 =
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛]
− 1 (12) 
The evolutionary diffusion of a new technique can then be formalized with the dynamics of 
replication. The variable 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 ∈ [0,1] indicates the share of firms in sector 𝑖 that adopt the new technique at 
time t, while (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  ) indicates the share that remains with the older technique. Because each sector has 
a large collection of firms, and assuming that they interact through random pairwise matching, we can use 
a simple replicator equation for the diffusion of innovations. Normalizing population sizes to unity allows 
us to work with population shares in each sector as follows: 
 
𝜐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ] 
∆𝜐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜐𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ] 
∆𝜐𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜐𝑖,𝑡[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑡] 
(13) 
The term 𝜐𝑖,𝑡(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡) is the variance of the firms within each sector and the term [𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 −  𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ] is 
the differential replication selection, so that the updating process is payoff monotonic. The third line in 
equation (13) follows from the fact that the average profit rate in each sector is: ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 = (𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑛 ] +
(1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝑜 ]. 
Technical change and its evolutionary diffusion imply that older and newer cost structures coexist 
until the newer technique completely replaces the older one. Given the monetary capital 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 committed to 
each sector, the new quantities supplied can be found by dividing the monetary capital advanced by the 
mixed cost structure: 
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 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜]
  (14) 
The supply equation in (14) thus replaces the supply equation in (6), which only applied to 
production under a single technology. Average rates of profit in each sector now depend on the prevailing 
market prices and on the linear combination between older and newer techniques: 
 ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑝𝑖,𝑡
(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜]
− 1 =  
∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
 (15) 
As soon as profit rates in each sector change from their previous position they trigger intra-sector 
competition via the micro replicator dynamic in equation (13) as well as inter-sector competition via the 
macro replicator dynamic in equation (10). The out-of-equilibrium adjustments and the evolution of the 
system over time explicitly reflect the interplay of unintended social consequences of uncoordinated 
individual actions. In the next section I analyze the stationary states that might prevail in the long run. 
6. Long-Run Equilibria and Evolutionary Stability  
In an evolutionary setting, differential replication offers a behavioral microfoundation for 
spontaneous and path-dependent interactions of multiple uncoordinated agents. The model becomes more 
intuitive if we focus on the trajectories of the three replicator equations (𝑓1,𝑡, 𝜐1,𝑡, 𝜐2,𝑡) toward their long-
run stationary states. Stationary states are those states at which the replicator reaches a fixed point with no 
further changes in the replication process (∆𝑓1,𝑡 = 0, ∆𝜐1,𝑡 = 0, ∆𝜐2,𝑡 = 0). The crucial procedure is to 
know which strategies are going to prevail asymptotically when 𝑡 → ∞. 
In an evolutionary game with replicator dynamics we know that the evolutionarily stable strategies 
prevail over the long run. An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a best response to itself and hence it is 
a symmetric Nash equilibrium that is also asymptotically stable in its respective replicator equation. 
Evolutionary stability implies both self-correction and asymptotic attractiveness (i.e., it is a stable attractor), 
[16] 
 
hence the system converges over time to a stationary point that is evolutionarily stable (Bowles 2006; Gintis 
2009; Elaydi 2005; Scheinerman 2000). 
In Table 1 I summarize the stationary states and asymptotic properties of each replicator equation. 
Note that in the macro inter-sector dynamic, when there is no ESS, the system converges to an interior 
stable solution 𝑓1
∗ such that average profit rates are equalized asymptotically across sectors. In this case, 
profit rates are not just equal across sectors but truly equalized in the sense that the equality in sector 
profitability is evolutionarily stable. In the Appendix, I provide a formal stability analysis of the stationary 
states. 
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 Because the technical coefficients in the input-output matrix are exogenous but not constant, a 
strategy that was an ESS before the technical change might not be an ESS after the innovation is introduced. 
As long as we have exogenous innovations brought into the system, the ESS’s themselves will change over 
time.  
The closure imposed on the system will determine which long-run equilibrium will prevail and 
whether or not the stationary state will be stable. In the next section I analyze the implications of an 
exogenous rate of exploitation as a first closure. In the subsequent section I then analyze an alternative 
closure with endogenous rates of exploitation. 
7. Say’s Law and the Exogenous Rate of Exploitation  
The first closure consists of an exogenous rate of exploitation and is the same closure that Marx 
employed in Chapter 9 of Capital III. An exogenous rate of exploitation means that the ex ante rate of 
[17] 
 
exploitation in production is identical to the rate of exploitation realized ex post in the market. An exogenous 
rate of exploitation, however, implies the deployment of Say’s super-Identity, the strongest version of Say’s 
Law.  
When the rate of exploitation is predetermined at the firm level then all values produced must be 
fully realized for all commodities, otherwise the rate of exploitation would not be constant throughout the 
circuit of capital. If we were to consider realization problems associated with the lack of effective demand, 
or if we were simply to acknowledge the fact that aggregate demand determines incomes, the rate of 
exploitation could not be predetermined exogenously at any given level.  
Because all values must be fully realized, and given that in the circuit of capital the total 
expenditures on labor power and means of production take place at the beginning of each production period, 
an exogenous rate of exploitation is equivalent to an exogenous functional distribution of income between 
wages and profits. The wage share in value added is 
𝑉
𝑉+𝑆
=
1
1+𝑒
 , in which V is the value of labor power (the 
total wage bill), S is surplus value or profits, 𝑒 = 𝑆
𝑉
 is the rate of exploitation, and V+S is the flow of value 
added in the economy. When the rate of exploitation is exogenous it will automatically predetermine the 
wage and profit shares of national income. The functional distribution of income is fixed and thus 
unresponsive to capital accumulation. 
In neo-Kaleckian models (Dutt 1990, 1984; Marglin 1984; Badhuri and Marglin 1990) the markup 
is exogenous and prices are fixed per unit of output; thus income distribution between wages and profits is 
also exogenous. Effective demand then determines the level of aggregate output and income. But this is not 
the case in Marx’s circuit of capital, as the beginning-of-period aggregate expenditures on wages and means 
of production are already set at their nominal levels. If wages vary according to the level of revenues 
realized and are paid not at the beginning of the circuit but at the end, the rate of exploitation becomes 
endogenous to demand. In the circuit of capital we can have either an exogenous rate of exploitation or the 
principle of effective demand at play, but not both simultaneously.  
[18] 
 
Once the rate of exploitation 𝑒 = 𝑆
𝑉
 is given exogenously at the firm level, and as V is fixed at the 
beginning of the capital circuit, this predetermines the amount of surplus value, S, to be realized and thus 
prevents individual profit rates from equalizing. The economy has no self-correction mechanism that would 
make profit rates sensitive to the amount of monetary capital advanced in each sector. As profit rates do not 
equalize in the long run, prices of production cannot function as gravitational centers for market prices. In 
the lines that follow I develop this reasoning in more technical detail. 
The hours worked per unit of output, 𝑙𝑖, generate the value added that corresponds to the summation 
of wages and profits. Workers in sector 𝑖 produce 𝑤𝑙𝑖(1 + 𝑒) of value added per unit of output but only get 
back the value of their labor power corresponding to 𝑤𝑙𝑖, thus leaving the surplus 𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑖 to the capitalists 
hiring them. The rate of exploitation 𝑒 is fixed and equal for all firms. The end-of-period expenditures 
match the total value produced, and profits originate from unpaid labor time: 
 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ = [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖(1 + 𝑒)]𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑒 𝑤𝑙𝑖  𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
(16) 
(17) 
In qualitative terms, profits originate from surplus value. In quantitative terms, and in this closure, 
causality runs from exploitation to profits (𝑒 → ∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡). Because of its supply-led principle, any version of 
Say’s Law implies that the quantity of surplus value produced determines the amount of surplus value 
realized as profits. This particular relation between profitability and exploitation derives from the fact that 
the price system is such that 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1i + 𝑤𝑙𝑖 + 𝑒𝑤𝑙𝑖 = [𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1i + 𝑤𝑙𝑖](1 +  𝑟𝑖,𝑡). Rearranging 
terms and solving for the profit rate gives us: 
 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑒
1 + (
𝑝1,𝑡−1
𝑤 ) (
𝑎1𝑖
𝑙𝑖
)
 
(18) 
[19] 
 
Equation (18) is the usual Marxist relation in which the profit rate is the rate of exploitation divided 
by one plus the organic composition of capital. The organic composition is, in turn, the relative price 
𝑝1,𝑡−1
𝑤
 
times the technical composition 
𝑎1𝑖
𝑙𝑖
 between constant and variable capital.  
When 𝑒 is fixed, the long-run 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 will also be predetermined in both sectors as 𝑤, 𝑎1𝑖, and 𝑙𝑖 are all 
parameters, and Say’s super-Identity in sector I also predetermines the path of 𝑝1,𝑡. As 0 ≤ 𝑎11 < 1, there 
is a stationary state such that 𝑝1,𝑡 →
𝑤𝑙1(1+𝑒)
1−𝑎11
 as 𝑡 → ∞. However, even though market prices converge to a 
stationary state, this stationary state is not a price of production as profit rates are not equalized across 
sectors. 
Once firms begin to adopt technological innovations, the mixed productive structure requires 
weighting the surplus value produced by the respective shares of firms employing the newer and older 
technologies. Equations (19) and (20) replace equations (16) and (17) as soon as a new technique is 
introduced: 
 
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ = {(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑛 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛(1 + 𝑒)] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑝1,𝑡−1𝑎1𝑖
𝑜 + 𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜(1 + 𝑒)]}𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡 = {(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛𝑒] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑜𝑒]}𝑥𝑖,𝑡 
(19) 
(20) 
Increments in the share of firms adopting the new technology (𝜐𝑖,𝑡) can reduce or increase the 
average profit rate prevailing in a sector. But the final effect on profitability can only be known after the 
repricing of both the means of production and the final consumption good. 
To simulate the model in its first closure it is necessary to fix eleven parameters and three initial 
conditions. In this example the initial technical coefficients are set to (𝑎11
𝑜 , 𝑎12
𝑜 , 𝑙1
𝑜, 𝑙2
𝑜) = (0.2, 0.1, 0.7, 0.7) 
for the old technology. The nominal wage 𝑤 is set to 10 dollars per work hour, the rate of exploitation 𝑒 is 
set to 110%, and only 𝜇=20% of the firms migrate to another sector according to inter-sector average 
profitability differentials. The initial aggregate monetary capital 𝑀𝑡=1 is set to 100 dollars, and the initial 
[20] 
 
distribution is set at 60% to sector I (𝑓1,𝑡=1 = 0.6) and 40% to sector II (𝑓2,𝑡=1 = 0.4). The means of 
production are initially priced at 50 dollars per unit (𝑝1,𝑡=0 = 50). As I show in the Appendix, the long-
run stationary state is independent from these arbitrary initial conditions. 
The model is set to run for 400 periods. For the first 49 rounds the trajectories evolve without  
technical change. At period t=50, I introduce an innovation in sector II that increases labor productivity by 
100% while increasing the use of machines by 100% per unit of output, hence (𝑎11
𝑜 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑜, 𝑙2
𝑛) = (0.2, 0.2, 
0.7, 0.35). This machine-intensive labor-saving innovation generates a strong increase in the technical 
composition of capital in the sector producing the consumption good. At time t=100, I introduce an 
innovation in sector I that increases labor productivity by 150% and the use of the machines by 100% per 
unit of output such that (𝑎11
𝑛 , 𝑎12
𝑛 , 𝑙1
𝑛, 𝑙2
𝑛) = (0.4, 0.2, 0.28, 0.35). This innovation implies a strong machine-
intensive labor-saving technical change in the sector producing the means of production.  
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In Figure 1 I report the evolution of key variables under this first closure of the model. As expected, 
profit rates do not equalize even though they are temporarily equal across sectors for two specific moments 
in time, during the diffusion of the new techniques of production. Therefore, prices of production cannot 
function as gravitational centers for market prices. And even though the real wage is determined 
endogenously, the exogenous rate of exploitation fixes constant profit and wage shares of value added.  
The simulation additionally shows that the uncoordinated implementation of the new technologies 
increases the profit rate only for those firms initially adopting the innovation, but the gradual diffusion of 
the new technologies results in lower levels of profitability for all capitalists over time. Because the real 
wage is endogenous, not exogenous as in Okishio’s (1961) theorem, technical change can reduce the profit 
rate over the longer run. 
[21] 
 
8. Effective Demand and the Endogenous Rate of Exploitation  
In this section I offer a second closure in which the ex post rate of exploitation is endogenous and 
dependent upon the level of aggregate demand, as Marx suggested in Chapter 15 of Capital III. Once 
effective demand is brought into the framework, the rate of exploitation, and with it the distribution of 
income between wages and profits, automatically becomes dependent upon the demand side. Since effective 
demand determines the amount of surplus value realized and the ex post rate of exploitation, profitability 
becomes sensitive to the amount of monetary capital committed to each sector. Profit rates then equalize as 
long as 
d?̅?1,𝑡
d𝑓1,𝑡
<
d?̅?2,𝑡
d𝑓1,𝑡
 . In the Appendix I show under what parameter values this condition is met. 
The monetary capital 𝑀1,𝑡+1 effectively committed to production in sector I at the beginning of 
period t+1 reflects the capitalists’ expected profitability in that sector. This monetary capital 𝑀1,𝑡+1 
advanced is the ex ante demand at the beginning of period t+1, and as such it comprises the expenditure 
𝑀1,𝑡
′  necessary to realize the value produced in sector I at the end of the previous period, t. 
In this closure I opt for the neo-Keynesian autonomous investment function à la Joan Robinson 
(1962; see also Dutt 2011; 1990; Marglin 1984) which assumes that firms operate at full capacity utilization 
and that the amount of monetary capital committed to the investment good sector is a function of past 
profitability. The parameters 𝛾𝑖 indicate the sensitivity of ex ante investment demand to the observed profit 
rates in each sector, and the autonomous component is simply the investment carried out in the previous 
period (𝑀1,𝑡−1
′ ). Given that there are firms operating with the newer and older technologies simultaneously 
in each sector, we have that:  
 
𝑀1,𝑡+1 = 𝑀1,𝑡
′ = 𝑀1,𝑡−1
′ + 𝛾1{(𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑟1,𝑡−1
𝑛 ] + (1 − 𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑟1,𝑡−1
0 ]} 𝑀1,𝑡−1 
              + 𝛾2{(𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑟2,𝑡−1
𝑛 ] + (1 − 𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑟2,𝑡−1
0 ]} 𝑀2,𝑡−1 
(21) 
[22] 
 
In sector II, likewise, the monetary capital 𝑀2,𝑡+1  effectively committed to production at the 
beginning of period t+1 reflects the capitalists’ expected profitability for that sector. Supposing that workers 
do not save and that there is no consumption credit, the total expenditure 𝑀2,𝑡
′  with the consumption goods 
produced in sector II is simply the total wage bill in the economy. At the beginning of period t+1, capitalists 
commit to sector II an amount of monetary capital proportional to the aggregate consumption of out wages 
realized in the previous production period, t. Given that the wage bills in each sector must be weighted by 
the shares of firms using the old and the new technologies, we have that: 
 
𝑀2,𝑡+1 = 𝑀2,𝑡
′ = {(𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙1
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐1,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙1
0]} 𝑥1,𝑡 + 
{(𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙2
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐2,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙2
0]} 𝑥2,𝑡 
(22) 
  Therefore, effective demand at the beginning of period t+1 is 𝑀𝑡+1 ≡  𝑀1,𝑡+1 + 𝑀2,𝑡+1 = 𝑀1,𝑡
′ +
𝑀2,𝑡
′ , in which the second equality follows directly from equations (5) and (9). The endogenous rates of 
exploitation 𝑒𝑖,𝑡  within each sector are the sector surplus values realized over the nominal wage bill 
advanced: 
 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑀𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
{(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
0]} 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
=
𝑀𝑖,𝑡
′ − 𝑀𝑖,𝑡
{(𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
𝑛] + (1 − 𝜐𝑖,𝑡)[𝑤𝑙𝑖
0]} 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
 
(23) 
The rates of exploitation in each sector depend directly on the level of aggregate demand from 
equations (21) and (22). As under Say’s Law, in qualitative terms, profits originate from surplus value. But 
under Say’s Law, in quantitative terms, the determination ran from exploitation to realized profits (𝑒 →
∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡). The principle of effective demand, on the contrary, now implies that in quantitative terms the 
determination runs from profits to realized exploitation (𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ← ∆𝑀𝑖,𝑡) . Even though profits originate 
qualitatively from surplus value, under the principle of effective demand the amount of profits is the 
quantity of surplus value actually realized. 
[23] 
 
I simulate the model in its second closure to illustrate these points. To facilitate comparison with 
the model in its first closure I keep the same parameter values and innovation patterns as in the previous 
simulation. For the investment function I set 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 0.5, and investment demand begins at 50 dollars 
(𝑀1,𝑡=1
′ = 50) as an initial condition. Simulation results for key variables are reported in Figure 2. 
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Contrary to the first closure, the principle of effective demand can make profit rate equalization an 
evolutionarily stable long-run equilibrium. Prices of production can thus operate as gravitational centers for 
market prices. The level of exploitation, the real wage, as well as the wage and profit shares of value added 
now all respond to the trajectory of aggregate demand. As in the first closure, Okishio’s (1961) theorem 
does not hold when the real wage is endogenous: technical change increases the profit rates of the early 
adopters but ultimately reduces profitability over time for all companies in both sectors. 
9. Conclusion 
Marx was logically inconsistent in Chapter 9 of Capital III when he employed an exogenous rate 
of exploitation together with equalizing profit rates. Because an exogenous rate of exploitation implies the 
deployment of Say’s super-Identity —the strongest version of Say’s Law— profit rates cannot equalize 
across sectors and production prices cannot operate as gravitational centers for market prices. My solution 
to this logical inconsistency in Marx’s approach is to introduce Keynes’ principle of effective demand; such 
that the rate of exploitation becomes endogenous to the level of aggregate demand. Marx hinted at this 
solution in Chapter 15 of Capital III. The principle of effective demand allows for profit rates to equalize 
across sectors and prices of production to operate as stable attractors to market prices. 
[24] 
 
In this paper I developed an innovative evolutionary approach that formalizes Marx’s model of a 
competitive economy with technical change. I employed replicator dynamics and evolutionary game theory 
to demonstrate the superiority of Keynes’ principle of effective demand over Say’s Law within the Marxist 
framework of exploitation and accumulation. My evolutionary approach offers a clearer and more precise 
presentation of Marx’s system in Capital III. My approach additionally provides a way to integrate the 
equalization of profit rates within Kalecki’s framework, and I demonstrate that the Okishio theorem does 
not hold if the real wage is endogenous. 
Marxist scholars must drop Say’s Law if we aim to develop a theory that is both empirically 
relevant and logically consistent. The principle of effective demand offers us a better understanding of how 
aggregate demand determines the rate of exploitation, the rate of profit, the functional distribution of 
income, the diffusion of technological innovation, and the gravitation toward prices of production. 
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Appendix: Stability Analysis 
In this Appendix I present the stability analysis of the long-run stationary states under both closures. 
To avoid unnecessary complications I suppose no technical change in either sector (𝜐𝑖,𝑡 = 0 𝑜𝑟 1) and that 
the updating share is 100% (𝜇 = 1).  
Asymptotic stability means that the stationary state is both stable and an attractor, so the system 
converges to it over time (Scheinerman, 2000; Elaydi, 2005). In the one-dimensional replicator equation, 
asymptotic stability requires the payoff of a strategy to increase less than the competing payoff when the 
agents adopting that strategy increase their share in the population (Bowles 2006; Gintis 2009). The 
expected payoffs are the average profit rates within each sector; thus the stability condition is: 
 
d?̅?1,𝑡
d𝑓1,𝑡
<
d?̅?2,𝑡
d𝑓1,𝑡
 
(A.1) 
Under an exogenous rate of exploitation the model has a stationary state at 𝑝1
∗ =
𝑤𝑙1(1+𝑒)
1−𝑎11
 ; 𝑝2
∗ =
(
𝑎12
1−𝑎11
𝑙1 + 𝑙2) 𝑤(1 + 𝑒); 𝑟1
∗ =
𝑒
(
𝑎11
1−𝑎11
)(1+𝑒)+1
; and 𝑟2
∗ =
𝑒
(
𝑎12
1−𝑎11
.
𝑙1
𝑙2
)(1+𝑒)+1
. Profit rates are given in equation 
(19) and 
d𝑟1,𝑡
d𝑓1,𝑡
= 0 and 
d𝑟2,𝑡
d𝑓1,𝑡
= 0; thus the stability condition (A.1) is never satisfied. As described in Table 
1, three long-run equilibria are possible in this case: 
(i) The technical composition of capital is the same across sectors (
𝑎11
𝑙1
=
𝑎12
𝑙2
 ), which implies that 
𝑟1
∗ = 𝑟2
∗ and 𝑓1
∗ = 𝑓2
∗ = 0.5. The model is always at the unstable equilibrium. 
(ii) The technical composition of capital is higher in sector II (
𝑎11
𝑙1
<
𝑎12
𝑙2
 ), which implies that 𝑟1
∗ >
𝑟2
∗ and all monetary capital flows over time to sector I (𝑓1
∗ = 1). 
(iii) The technical composition of capital is higher in sector I (
𝑎11
𝑙1
>
𝑎12
𝑙2
 ), which implies that 𝑟1
∗ <
𝑟2
∗ and all monetary capital flows over time to sector II (𝑓1
∗ = 0). 
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Under an endogenous rate of exploitation the model has a stationary state with equalized profit 
rates across sectors at 𝑝1
∗ =
𝑤𝑙1(1+𝑟
∗)
1−𝑎11(1+𝑟∗)
; 𝑝2
∗ = [
𝑤𝑙1𝑎12(1+𝑟
∗)
1−𝑎11(1+𝑟∗)
+ 𝑤𝑙2] (1 + 𝑟
∗) ; (
𝑒1
𝑒2
)
∗
=
𝑝1
∗
𝑤
.
𝑎11
𝑙1
+1
𝑝1
∗
𝑤
.
𝑎12
𝑙2
 +1
; (
𝑥1
𝑥2
)
∗
=
(
𝑓1
∗
1−𝑓1
∗)
𝑝1
∗𝑎12+𝑤𝑙2
𝑝1
∗𝑎11+𝑤𝑙1
. With some algebraic manipulation, the stability condition (A.1) is satisfied when: 
 𝛾1 (
𝑓1,𝑡−1
1 + ?̃?𝑡−1
) − 𝛾2 (
𝑓1,𝑡−1 + ?̃?𝑡−1
1 + ?̃?𝑡−1
) < (
𝑓1,𝑡
1 − 𝑓1,𝑡
)
2
(
1
𝑝1,𝑡−1
𝑤
𝑎11
𝑙1
+ 1
) (A.2) 
This inequality means that the stationary state 0 < 𝑓1
∗ < 1 tends to become less stable when, ceteris 
paribus: (i) the organic composition of capital in sector I (
𝑝1,𝑡−1
𝑤
𝑎11
𝑙1
) is very high; (ii) the ratio between the 
sector investment coefficients (
𝛾1
𝛾2
) is very high. Computer simulations confirm these results and further 
indicate that the stationary state becomes less stable, ceteris paribus, at low values of the updating share 𝜇. 
But as long as 𝛾1 and 𝛾2 are not too far apart and the technical composition 
𝑎11
𝑙1
 in sector I is not too high, 
the stationary state with equalized profit rates is asymptotically stable under the principle of effective 
demand. 
The stability condition (A.1) refers to the one-dimensional replicator in which the economy has 
only two sectors, so the interior solution 0 < 𝑓1
∗ < 1 is either stable or unstable. In an economy with three 
or more sectors the stability condition in higher dimensions would cover cases with saddle path stability 
and limit cycles. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper but will be pursued in further work. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Stationary States and Asymptotic Properties 
                                              Stationary States 
(a) Macro Inter-Sector Replicator 
Sector I is ESS 
Sector II is ESS 
Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 ?̅?1,𝑡 ≷ ?̅?2,𝑡 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
0 < 𝑓𝑖,𝑡
∗ < 1  is unstable 
Sector I is ESS 
Sector II is not ESS 
Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 ?̅?1,𝑡 > ?̅?2,𝑡 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
Sector I is not ESS 
Sector II is ESS 
Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 ?̅?1,𝑡 < ?̅?2,𝑡 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
No ESS Δ𝑓𝑖,𝑡+1 = 0 ?̅?1,𝑡 = ?̅?2,𝑡 
0 < 𝑓𝑖,𝑡
∗ < 1  is stable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝑓1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
(b) Micro Intra-Sector Replicator in Sector I 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 
 
𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 ≷ 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
0 < 𝑣1,𝑡
∗ < 1  is unstable 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is not ESS 
∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 > 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
Innovate is not ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 < 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
No ESS ∆𝜐1,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑟1,𝑡
𝑜  
0 < 𝑣1,𝑡
∗ < 1  is stable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
(c) Micro Intra-Sector Replicator in Sector II 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 
 
𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 ≷ 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
0 < 𝑣2,𝑡
∗ < 1  is unstable 
Innovate is ESS 
Not innovate is not ESS 
∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 > 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1  is stable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
Innovate is not ESS 
Not innovate is ESS 
∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 < 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1  is unstable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 0  is stable 
No ESS ∆𝜐2,𝑡+1 = 0 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑛 = 𝑟2,𝑡
𝑜  
0 < 𝑣2,𝑡
∗ < 1  is stable 
𝜐2,𝑡 = 1   is unstable 
𝜐1,𝑡 = 0  is unstable 
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Figure 1: Simulation of the Evolutionary Model with Say’s super-Identity  
and an Exogenous Rate of Exploitation 
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Figure 2: Simulation of the Evolutionary Model with Effective Demand  
and Endogenous Rates of Exploitation 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
